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We begin this Article by sharing something about our past legal 
practice careers, as we believe that is so relevant to the topic that we 
focus on in this Article. When Michael L. Perlin was a rookie Public 
Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, in the early 1970s, he regularly visited 
the Menlo Park Diagnostic Center where some of his clients—those who 
had been found, in the phrase used then, to be “repetitive and 
compulsive” sex offenders—were housed.1 When Heather Ellis Cucolo 
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1. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-3 (West 2018), repealed by N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:98-2 (West 1979). See generally Deborah W. Denno, 
Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1317 
(1998) (discussing how psychiatry was used to explain criminal behavior, 
including the criminal behavior of repeat or capital offenders). 
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was a rookie Public Defender in Newark, New Jersey, in the late 2000s, 
she regularly visited the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”), attached to 
the state prison in Avenel, New Jersey, where some of her clients—now 
classified as sexually violent predators—were housed.2 When the two of 
us talked about our experiences during the latter years, we were stunned 
at the similarities that we found: almost no meaningful treatment of 
any sort, prison-like conditions, and a population comprised of a 
minority of people whom we agreed posed a significant danger to the 
community but a majority of whom had committed crimes involving no 
personal contact.3 
As we discussed our experiences further, we both inevitably focused 
on the topic at the heart of this Article: the way that improper statistics 
and unverified data has contaminated the “debate” surrounding the 
post-conviction treatment of sex offenders—whether in Facebook 
discussions or in U.S. Supreme Court cases. We believe we have an 
absolute obligation to call out those who distort the evidence and create 
a false consciousness in this area, be they TV news pundits or Supreme 
Court justices.4 We use the word “corrupts” in our title consciously 
because we believe that what has resulted is the corruption of the 
judicial process.5 Our thesis is simple—an examination of a range of  
2. See generally Melissa Wangenheim, ‘To Catch a Predator,’ Are We 
Casting Our Nets Too Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil 
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 559, 559–83 (2010) 
(examining the characteristics of individuals labeled sexually violent 
predators and describing admissions at New Jersey’s Special Treatment 
Units). 
3. In the 1970s, the vast majority of residents of the sex offender facility in 
New Jersey were charged with such crimes as peeking in windows and the 
theft of underwear from laundromats. 
4. For an example of news articles that create a sense of panic without 
verifiable sources see, e.g., 37 Scary Repeat Sex Offenders Statistics, 
Health Res. Funding, https://healthresearchfunding.org/37-scarey-
repeat-sex-offenders-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/ACB7-3DYH] (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2019). For articles discussing problems with the sex registration 
system and the portrayal of sex offenders to the general public see Jessica 
M. Pollak & Charis E. Kubrin, Crime in the News: How Crimes, Offenders 
and Victims Are Portrayed in the Media, 14 J. Crim. Just. & Popular 
Culture 59, 60–64 (2007); Tom Condon, Sex Offender Registry: More Harm 
than Good?, Conn. Mirror (May 21, 2018), https://ctmirror.org/2018/ 
05/21/sex-offender-registry-harm-good/ [https://perma.cc/SN6Z-P3DX] 
(describing the argument that sex offender registries are based on myths 
and do not solve any problems). We are not so naïve to think this Article 
will make much of a difference on Facebook debates, but we do hope that 
it may eventually have an impact on the way that both trial and appellate 
courts approach these issues. 
5. We are aware that the phrase “judicial corruption” usually includes the 
receipt of something of value. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Koller & Elizabeth B. 
Koller, Splintered Justice: Is Judicial Corruption Breaking the Bench?, 47 
Crim. L. Bull. 948, 952 (2011) (“[W]e define judicial corruption as: a 
breach of the public’s delegated and implied trust in which judges 
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judicial decisions involving sexual offender determinations reveals that, 
frequently, courts rely improperly on inaccurate and underdeveloped 
statistics as well as unverified and outdated information. This reliance, 
too often, underlies rulings that subject the sex offender to significant 
sanctions and loss of liberty. Additionally, the continuation of the 
testimonial script that all sex offenders are high recidivists, dangerous, 
compulsive, and untreatable contributes to the anti-therapeutic effect 
of shaming and humiliation.6 This narrative results in isolation, 
seclusion, and lack of dignity; also, it further trivializes the judicial 
process and violates the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence. We will 
consider each of these, and we will look at all of this through the filter 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in McKune v. Lile,7 a case decided 
sixteen years ago that is now beginning to resurface in new, critical 
literature that has deconstructed the case’s basic fallacy in ways that 
we hope will stay at the forefront of this debate for the coming years.8 
We argue here that, in fact, the “strings in the book” are “pulled 
and persuaded”9 so that judges do not have to deal with the reality to 
 
manipulate the power of their official positions by receiving or agreeing 
to receive something of value in return for influence in the performance 
of their official duties.”) (emphasis in original). However, the meaning of 
“corruption” in this context goes far beyond the simple exchange of 
money-for-favors. See Kellam Conover, Rethinking Anti-Corruption 
Reforms: The View from Ancient Athens, 62 Buff. L. Rev. 69, 69 (2014) 
(quoting Aristotle, Aristotle: Politics bk. III, § 1279a29–33 (H. 
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. & report ed. 1990)) (“Over two 
millennia ago, Aristotle posited that ruling in one’s own interest, not in 
the people’s interest, causes polities to deviate from their intended 
purpose—what he terms ‘corruption.’”); see also Zephyr Teachout, Love, 
Equality, and Corruption, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 454 (2015) (arguing 
that Aristotle understood corruption in the context of “questions of 
motive, intent, feeling, and passion”). 
6. We discuss how “the focus of sexual offender laws is to shame and 
humiliate those persons subject to regulation” extensively in Michael L. 
Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, Shaming the Constitution: The 
Detrimental Results of Sexual Violent Predator Legislation 3 
(2017). 
7. 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
8. For the most recent critique, see David T. Goldberg & Emily R. Zhang, 
Our Fellow American, the Registered Sex Offender, 2016 Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 59, 76 (2016–17) (“Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in McKune 
v. Lile . . . offered a litany of deeply problematic factual assertions about 
‘sex offenders’ that continue to shape legal decisions to this day.”). 
9. Our title comes from one of Bob Dylan’s greatest songs, The Lonesome 
Death of Hattie Carroll, about the death of a country club waitress at the 
hands of an inebriated tobacco empire scion. It comes from a verse that—
importantly for our purposes—talks about the sort of judicial corruption 
that Dylan saw in that case (in which the defendant was given a six-
month sentence): 
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which they willfully blind themselves.10 The premises of judges’ 
decisions related to the assessment of who is a sexually violent predator 
are built on houses of cards that could and should crumble quickly if 
we dispassionately examine the underlying statistics and data. A recent 
article critiqued the teleological way that courts interpret biologically-
based evidence in a range of criminal procedure cases so that they can 
end up with the result that, a priori, they want to reach. Indeed, 
“judges . . . , like the rest of us, are subject to an incessant media 
barrage of media hysteria on questions of whether sex offenders are 
likely to recidivate.”11 We believe that it is impossible to make sense of 
the law or the science in this volatile area of law and policy until we 
come to grips with this reality. 
Part I of this Article considers how courts rely on inaccurate 
statistics when deciding whether a sex offender is likely to recidivate.12 
Part I also contrasts these inaccurate statistics with the accurate 
statistics and looks carefully at this misuse of statistics in the context 
of the McKune case and the denouement of that decision. Part II 
 
In the courtroom of honor, the judge pounded his gavel 
To show that all’s equal and that the courts are on the level 
And that the strings in the books ain’t pulled and persuaded 
And that even the nobles get properly handled. 
 Bob Dylan, The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll (Columbia 
Records 1964) (emphasis added). 
10. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 
(2011) (“Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted 
knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful 
blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes 
by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts 
that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”). 
11. Michael L. Perlin, ‘I’ve Got My Mind Made Up’: How Judicial Teleology 
in Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 24 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 81, 89 (2017) 
(citing, inter alia, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, ‘They’re 
Planting Stories in the Press’: The Impact of Media Distortions on Sex 
Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 185, 215 (2013)); 
see, e.g., Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Molesters Often Strike Again, Fox 
News, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/04/16/molesters-often-strike-
again.html [https://perma.cc/4KWS-YSGT] (last updated May 19, 2015) 
(quoting forensic psychologist Louis Schlesinger’s statement that 
“[recidivism of sexual predators] happens all the time”). 
12. It has now become clear that this may not be the only area of the law in 
which this sort of misplaced reliance has occurred. See, e.g., John 
Lightbourne, Damned Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based 
Tools, 15 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 327 (2017) (discussing the courts 
misplaced reliance on statistics regarding sentencing decision-making); 
Ryan Gabrielson, Suspect Evidence Informed a Momentous Supreme 
Court Decision on Criminal Sentencing, ProPublica (Dec. 11, 2017, 11:40 
A.M.), https://www.propublica.org/article/suspect-evidence-momentous-
supreme-court-decision-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/5JPP-7SMN]. 
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discusses how these errors have led to the inappropriate shaming and 
humiliation of persons enmeshed in the Sexually Violent Predator Act 
(“SVPA”) commitment process.13 Part II also explains how these errors 
have consequently trivialized the judicial process, noting, however, that 
there have been some recent cases that consider the underlying issues 
more seriously. Part III explores the meaning and significance of 
therapeutic jurisprudence in this context and seeks to expose how the 
errors in question violate all the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
We conclude with some modest suggestions for the courts and for 
litigators in this complex and difficult area of the law. 
I. How Courts Rely on Inaccurate Statistics 
Sex offender statutes and implementing court decisions are designed 
to isolate, restrict, and/or remove sexual offenders from society.14 Strict 
monitoring and post-criminal sentence sanctions have been deemed 
necessary for two central reasons: (1) such individuals commit crimes 
that society has deemed to be the most heinous,15 and (2) sex offenders 
have a high rate of recidivism and are highly likely to repeat offending 
behaviors.16 
 
13. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the 
Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, 
Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 1, 41–47 (2014) 
(discussing how sex offender registration acts (“SORAs”) are “based on 
flawed reasoning” that “shame and stigmatize sex offenders and deny 
them meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation”). 
14. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Applying the Lessons of GPS Monitoring of 
Batterers to Sex Offenders, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 281, 283 (2008) 
(“Residency restrictions push sex offenders to more rural areas at the 
outskirts of cities and towns. Not only does this remove sex offenders from 
the areas where they are likely to find work and treatment, but it also 
isolates them from society, aggravates their housing problems, and forces 
them to live near each other.”); Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 
1370–71 (2015) (holding that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a 
person was a Fourth Amendment search); Ben A. McJunkin & J.J. 
Prescott, Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological 
Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders, 21 New Crim. L. Rev. 379 
(2018). 
15. When members of the public are asked to imagine a typical sex offender 
or offense, “most people naturally envision sex offenders who commit the 
most heinous sex offenses such as rape and child sexual abuse.” Margaret 
C. Stevenson et al., The Influence of a Juvenile’s Abuse History on 
Support for Sex Offender Registration, 21 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 
35, 40–41 (2015). 
16. There is some important empirical evidence that such laws actually 
increase the rate of recidivism. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, 
Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal 
Behavior?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161, 161 (2011); Stephanie N.K. Robbins, 
Homelessness Among Sex Offenders: A Case for Restricted Sex Offender 
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There are two major sorts of legislative enactments designed to 
confine and restrict offenders—civil commitment laws and registration 
and notification laws. Both of these legal sanctions necessitate the use 
of expert testimony during court proceedings.17 Expert predictions of 
future violence is “central to the ultimate question: . . . whether 
petitioners suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder”18 
that causes them to be predisposed to commit future crimes.19 
Importantly, the bases for these predictions have not gone 
unchallenged. In 2004, a Florida appellate judge wrote that “[w]e have 
embarked on the first steps into a new world, arguably a science fiction 
world, in which judges and juries are asked to prevent crimes years 
before they occur.”20 Judicial opinions are constrained by the statutory 
language that requires expert testimony on the issue of dangerousness.21 
 
Registration and Notification, 20 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 205, 
208 (2010). 
17. In the few cases that have considered the question, such testimony has 
regularly passed the standard for the admission of expert testimony 
established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–92 (1993), which determined 
that scientific evidence is admissible if it is valid and reliable. See Melissa 
Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future 
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 
697, 735–40 (2011) (summarizing Daubert and Frye challenges to future 
dangerousness evidence). 
18. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993). 
19. In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 714 (Wash. 2003); In re Detention 
of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). See generally Fed. 
R. Evid. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if . . . scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue . . . .”). 
20. In re Commitment of Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004); see also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(“[T]he thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs.”). On the admissibility of scientific evidence testimony 
based on the sorts of risk assessment instruments typically used in sex 
offender cases, see Douglas Mossman et al., Risky Business Versus Overt 
Acts: What Relevance Do “Actuarial,” Probabilistic Risk Assessments 
Have for Judicial Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization?, 
11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 365, 399–400 n.158 (2011); see also 
Hamilton, supra note 17, at 735–37. 
21. For decades, a debate has raged on the parallel question of the extent to 
which an expert mental health professional can predict dangerousness on 
the part of someone subject to involuntary civil commitment. See 
generally Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, Mental 
Disability Law: Civil and Criminal §§ 3-4 to 3-4.2.4 (3d ed. 2017). 
By way of example, John Monahan and Henry Steadman have questioned 
the factors used by mental health professionals to make clinical 
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Thus, in responding to a challenge to admitted future dangerousness 
testimony, a Massachusetts trial judge has stated that courts must 
“respect [the] policy of [the] legislature with respect to the 
trustworthiness of psychiatric opinion evidence in cases involving 
sexually dangerous persons.”22 For a judge to make a ruling on the 
potential future risk of an individual, his or her ultimate decision is 
inevitably purely based on the subjective opinion of an expert witness, 
devoid of concrete answers and verifiable scientific conclusions.23 And 
courts have erred on the side of caution, willing to easily accept an 
expert’s determination of high risk.24 
This notion of a purported reality of high recidivism has been 
perpetuated by experts working in the field of sex offender assessment, 
court decisions supporting civil commitment of offenders after they have 
served a criminal sentence, and, most notably, the media. All three of 
these contributing factors are interconnected and have continuously 
built upon each other’s misinformation and inaccurately perceived 
truths.25 
The media has focused significantly on the heinous and highly 
emotionally charged crimes of individuals such as Earl Shriner, whose 
 
assessments of dangerousness. “[U]nless actuarial research can 
independently verify the predictive value of these and other, more 
theoretically derived factors, their actual as opposed to perceived 
usefulness in risk assessment will remain unknown.” John Monahan & 
Henry J. Steadman, Toward a Rejuvenation of Risk Assessment Research, 
in Violence and Mental Disorder 7 (John Monahan & Henry J. 
Steadman eds., 1994), discussed in Grant H. Morris, Defining 
Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 61, 86 n.145 (1999). At the best, mental health professionals cannot 
predict long-term dangerousness accurately “at much better than a 
modest level of accuracy.” Perlin & Cucolo, supra, at § 3-4.2.3 (citing 
John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in 1 
Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert 
Testimony § 7.2.2-1[2], at 317(David Faigman et al. eds., 1997)). 
22. Commonwealth v. Parks, No. 04709, 2005 WL 1367112, at *4 (Mass. Mar. 
9, 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. McGruder, 205 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Mass. 
1965)). 
23. On the dangers of admitting unverified expert testimony in other forensic 
settings, see Valena E. Beety, Cops in Lab Coats and Forensics in the 
Courtroom, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 543, 545 (2016), which characterizes 
sole reliance on “an individual forensic analyst” as a “dangerous path.” 
24. On how fear of voter retaliation supports this approach, at least in part, 
see generally Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting 
Stories in the Press”: The Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender 
Law and Policy, 3 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 185 (2013) [hereinafter 
Cucolo & Perlin, Impact of Media Distortions]. 
25. And this observation is not new. See Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. Lilienfeld, 
Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender? Maybe Not., Sci. Am. (Apr. 
1, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/misunderstood-crimes/ 
[https://perma.cc/2WCW-648P]. 
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crime precipitated the first new generation sex offender law, and Jesse 
Timmendequas, whose victim is the namesake of Megan’s Law.26 A 
writer of a New York Times op-ed column in 1993 concluded that 
“[t]here can be no dispute that monsters live among us. The only 
question is what to do with them once they become known to us.”27 As 
a result of the media’s depiction of a one-dimensional “sex offender” in 
broadcast news and newspaper articles,28 the general public has 
conceptualized what it believes to be the prototype of this “monstrous 
imminent evil”—a male who violently attacks young children who are 
strangers.29 The common wisdom is that—per the television series, Law 
 
26. Earl Shriner’s crime provoked Washington State to enact the first of the 
new generation sex offender laws, and the murder and sexual assault of 
Megan Kanka by Jesse Timmendequas produced New Jersey’s Megan’s 
Law, which served as the “model community notification law” for other 
states to follow. See Cucolo & Perlin, Impact of Media Distortions, supra 
note 24, at 188 n.26. For a recent article offering an array of legal theories 
under which such laws might be challenged, including substantive due 
process, see Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of “New-
Generation” SORN Laws, 21 New Crim. L. Rev. 426 (2018). 
27. Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can’t Be Saved, Zero (Jan. 5, 1993), 
http://www.vachss.com/av_dispatches/disp_9301_a.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3J46-7V6G]. Vachss is a popular novelist and an attorney who 
represents children and youth in abuse/neglect, delinquency, 
custody/visitation proceedings, and related tort litigation. See Andrew 
Vachss—Credentials, Zero, http://www.vachss.com/vachss/credentials.html 
[https://perma.cc/DTU7-C3UF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). He writes 
frequently about what he perceives as the nature of evil as reflected in the 
actions of sex offenders. See Sick vs. Evil, Zero, http://www.vachss.com/ 
mission/sick_vs_evil.html [https://perma.cc/8JT8-69MH] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2019). 
28. Pollak & Kubrin, supra note 4, at 60 (“Reality is socially constructed, in 
large part, through the media, which provides a way for dominant values 
in society to be articulated to the public.”); id. at 64 (“With regards to 
emotion, newspapers focus on ideas whereas television emphasizes ‘feeling, 
appearance, mood . . . there is a retreat from distant analysis and a dive 
into emotional and sensory involvement.’”). 
29. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender 
Recidivism through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and 
Specialized Community Integration, 22 Temple Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 1, 
16 (2012) [hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender 
Recidivism]; Helen Gavin, The Social Construction of the Child Sex 
Offender Explored by Narrative, 10 Qualitative Rep. 395, 395 (2005) 
(“The Dominant narrative construction, in Western societies, concerning 
child sex offenders identifies such individuals as purely male, inherently 
evil, inhuman, beyond redemption or cure, lower class, and unknown to 
the victim . . . .”). On the “monster” metaphor in general, see John 
Douard & Pamela D. Schultz, Monstrous Crimes and the 
Failure of Forensic Psychiatry (David C. Thomasma et al. eds., 
2013). 
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and Order: SVU—recidivism rates are near 100 percent for sex 
offenders.30 
The role of the media in the development of sex offender law is a 
base reflection of the power of fear in the creation of law and policy. 
By extrapolating from the scenario of the worst case,31 we have created 
policies that reject valid and reliable statistics, reject science, and, 
instead, generate a body of statutes and court decisions based on 
inaccurate presumptions. For example, prior to the enactment of 
national sex crime registries and notification laws, there were no 
verifiable reports of any increase in sex crimes.32 In fact, a federally 
funded study showed that a decline in sexual assault cases began before 
the enactment of sex offender reforms. This finding would seem to 
indicate that, since the pattern of decline began prior to the enactment 
of sex crime reforms, the laws themselves could not have affected the 
start of this downward pattern.33 
The judiciary is susceptible to the same moral panic as the press 
and the general public. The media-driven panic over sex offenders has 
directly influenced judicial decisions—at the trial, intermediate 
appellate, and Supreme Court levels—in this area of the law, especially 
in jurisdictions with elected judges.34 The demonization of this 
population has helped create a “moral panic”35 that has driven the 
 
30. See Cucolo & Perlin, Impact of Media Distortions, supra note 24, at 217. 
31. This is a perfect reflection of the vividness heuristic. See infra note 156 
and accompanying text. 
32. Christina Mancini, J. C. Barnes & Daniel P. Mears, It Varies from State 
to State: An Examination of Sex Crime Laws Nationally, 24 Crim. Just. 
Pol’y Rev. 166, 171 (2011). 
33. See Kristen Zgoba et al., Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical 
and Monetary Efficacy 37 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/225370.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4P4-9HNL]. A more recent 
study by Professor Zgoba and two colleagues tracked 547 convicted sex 
offenders over a fifteen-year period and concluded that SORN laws “do[] 
not have a demonstrable effect on future offending.” Kristen M. Zgoba, 
Wesley G. Jennings & Lara M. Salerno, Megan’s Law 20 Years Later: An 
Empirical Analysis and Policy Review, 45 Crim. Just. & Behav. 1028, 
1044 (2018); see also Susan K. Livio, Maureen Kanka Defends Megan’s 
Law Despite Report Saying It Fails to Deter Pedophiles, N.J. Real-Time 
News (Feb. 6, 2009, 7:55 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/ 
02/despite_new_report_on_megans_l.html [https://perma.cc/S7QJ-JW2R] 
(reporting Megan Kanka’s mother’s (Maureen Kanka) statement to the 
Newark Star-Ledger (New Jersey’s largest circulation newspaper) that the 
“purpose of [Megan’s Law] was to provide an awareness to parents . . . . 
Five million people have gone to the state web site. It’s doing what it was 
supposed to do . . . . We never said it was going to stop them from 
reoffending or wandering to another town.”). 
34. Cucolo & Perlin, Impact of Media Distortions, supra note 24, at 218–19. 
35. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in 
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 Ind. L.J. 315, 346–66 (2001); Eric Fink, Liars 
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passage of legislation. Yet, valid and reliable research has found this 
legislation to be counterproductive and engendering a more dangerous 
set of conditions36 and judicial decisions—all reflecting the “anger and 
hostility the public feels” about this population.37 
In the case of United States v. Comstock,38 the Supreme Court’s 
opinion reinforced the power of Congress to prevent this “dangerous” 
cohort of individuals from entering society.39 Although it is impossible 
to know with any level of confidence whether the Justices writing for 
the majority were moved or influenced in any way by public 
sentiment,40 there is no doubt that the majority blindly accepted the  
and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics 
of Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2019, 
2038–39 (2008). 
36. Tusty ten Bensel & Lisa L. Sample, Social Inclusion Despite Exclusionary 
Sex Offense Laws: How Registered Citizens Cope with Loneliness, Crim. 
Just. Pol’y Rev. 1, 1–2 (2016); see also Human Rights Watch, No 
Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US 43 (2007), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-
us [https://perma.cc/89WH-VKXA]. We have known this for at least two 
decades. See Eric Janus & Robert Prentky, Sexual Predator Law: A Two-
Decade Retrospective, 21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 91 n.24 (2008) (citing state 
reports as sources); Joanna S. Markman, Community Notification and the 
Perils of Mandatory Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Dangers 
Faced by Children and Their Families, 32 Seton Hall Legis. J. 261, 
282–83 (2008). 
37. Meghan Gilligan, It’s Not Popular but It Sure Is Right: The 
(In)Admissibility of Statements Made Pursuant to Sexual Offender 
Treatment Programs, 62 Syracuse L. Rev. 255, 271 (2012). 
38. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
39. The Comstock Court expressly declined to address whether 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4248 or its application denied equal protection, procedural or 
substantive due process, or any other constitutional rights. Id. at 149–50. 
Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative 
Detention, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 969, 996 (2011) (“[T]he 
majority opinion essentially rewrote law surrounding the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to allow for virtually unfettered federal power in the area 
of sex offender civil commitment.”). 
40. For sixty years, it has been a “given” that the Supreme Court is 
responsive. See Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957) 
(“The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court are never 
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among lawmaking 
majorities of the United States.”). More recent studies, interestingly, 
suggest there is a four-year to seven-year time lag between the expression 
of public opinion and its articulation in Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., 
William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal 
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic 
Perspective, 58 J. Pol. 169, 195–98 (1996); William Mishler & Reginald 
Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The 
Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 87, 92 (1993). The most recent study is clear: “[T]he empirical 
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opinion that sexual predators will pose a high risk of dangerousness and 
that future risk can be determined.41 Notably, three of the five persons 
designated as “sexually dangerous” whose appeals were heard in the 
Comstock case were on charges of possession of child pornography.42 
Although child pornography is a crime that continuously harms the 
victim through dissemination, recent studies show an overall lower risk 
for reoffense.43 Additionally, researchers disagree on the risk between 
viewing child pornography and committing a contact offense, with the 
general consensus that exclusive internet offenders have a low risk of 
recidivism.44 
In a 5-year fixed follow-up sample of 266 child pornography 
offenders who had some opportunity to reoffend in the community, the 
mean CPORT score was 1.94 (SD = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.74 - 2.12, range 
0–7). Eleven percent committed a new sexual offense, with 3 percent 
committing a new contact sexual offense against a child (17 years of 
age or younger) and 9 percent committing a new child pornography 
offense. 
The valid and reliable research paints an entirely different picture 
from the one accepted by the general public and the media and 
unthinkingly endorsed by the Supreme Court.45 Contemporaneous 
Department of Justice statistics demonstrate that “[n]ot only do few 
sex offenders get rearrested for committing a new sex crime, but sex 
offenders are less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any 
crime at all.”46 This is certainly an extremely complicated area and 
 
results suggest justices write opinions with an eye toward anticipated 
public opinion.” Ryan C. Black et al., The Influence of Public Sentiment 
on Supreme Court Opinion Clarity, 50 Law & Soc’y Rev. 703, 727 
(2016). 
41. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 131. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion focuses upon 
the fears of “dangerousness” and “risk” in allowing this population to 
return to the community and, therefore, must support federal 
intervention. Citing evidence of the States’ unwillingness to assume the 
financial burden of containing these individuals, Justice Alito deemed that 
the burden thus fell upon Congress to prevent these prisoners to enter the 
community and “present a danger [wherever] they chose to live or visit.” 
Id. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 131. Graydon Earl Comstock, Jr. had served a 37-month sentence 
in federal prison for receiving child pornography. 
43. M.C. Seto & A.W. Eke, Predicting Recidivism Among Adult Male Child 
Pornography Offenders: Development of the Child Pornography Offender 
Risk Tool (CPORT), 39 L. & Hum. Behav. 416, 426 (2015). 
44. Babchishin et al., Online Child Pornography Offenders Are Different: A 
Meta-analysis of the Characteristics of Online and Offline Sex Offenders 
Against Children, 44 Archives Sexual Behav. 45 (2015). 
45. See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
46. See Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh 
Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments 
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outcomes can vary based on the definitions of “re-offense,” the cohort 
studied, and the methods used in carrying out the study. Thus, the 
conclusions of numerous reports and studies on re-offense and 
dangerousness are hotly contested,47 but recent studies undeniably show 
misguidance in our general understanding of recidivism. 
 1. Since 1992, sex offenses in the U.S. have declined by 60 
percent; rape rates, too, have followed a similar trajectory.48 
Recidivism rates for all released prisoners, not just those who 
committed a sexual crime, tend to range between 56.7 percent 
(within one year after release) and 76.6 percent (within five years 
after release).49 
 2. For non-incarcerated sex offenders, five-year recidivism 
rates were less than 5 percent for federal probationers.50 
Additionally, previous research consistently found that recidivism 
rates for sex offenders are generally lower than 20 percent after a 
five-year follow-up.51 
 
Too Far?, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 391, 396–97 (2012) (citing U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison 
in 1994, at 2 (2003)). 
47. See generally Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, The Effects of Prison-Based 
Educational Programming on Recidivism and Employment, 4 Prison J. 
454 (2014). 
48. David Finkelhor & Lisa Jones, Have Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse 
Declined Since the 1990s?, Crimes Against Child. Res. Ctr., Nov. 
2012, at 1; see also Erica Goode, Researchers See Decline in Child Sexual 
Abuse Rate, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/29/us/rate-of-child-sexual-abuse-on-the-decline.html [https:// 
perma.cc/86QU-6YZX] (“Overall cases of child sexual abuse fell more 
than 60 percent from 1992 to 2010, according to David Finkelhor, a 
leading expert on sexual abuse who, with a colleague, Lisa Jones, has 
tracked the trend. The evidence for this decline comes from a variety of 
indicators, including national surveys of child abuse and crime 
victimization, crime statistics compiled by the F.B.I., analyses of data 
from the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect and annual 
surveys of grade school students in Minnesota, all pointing in the same 
direction.”). But see Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape 
Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1197 (2014) 
(discussing a study that addresses how widespread the practice of 
undercounting rape is in police departments across the country). 
49. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States 
in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, Bureau of Just. Stat. (Apr. 22, 
2014), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4986 [https:// 
perma.cc/6ZBH-73L2]. 
50. William Rhodes et al., Recidivism of Offenders on Federal 
Community Supervision 5 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
bjs/grants/241018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4AA-92C8]. 
51. Lawrence L. Bench & Terry D. Allen, Assessing Sex Offender Recidivism 
Using Multiple Measures: A Longitudinal Analysis, 4 Prison J. 411, 413 
(2013). 
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 3. An early study that looked at released offenders found 
that the rates of recidivism are similar to those of other incarcerated 
offenders, with rates of reoffending for sex crimes falling around 28 
percent.52 
 4. Older age is generally tied to lower risk of recidivism 
amongst sex offenders. A 2003 report found that: “(1) age was a 
‘powerful determinant’ of sexual arousal assessed by volumetric 
phallometry,53 and (2) sexual recidivism decreased as a linear 
function of age at time of release from prison (based on an analysis 
of 468 sex offenders released from a federal penitentiary in 
Ontario).”54 The authors posited that “these findings are less than 
surprising, given the well documented decline of bioavailable 
testosterone over the course of the lifespan, and the equally well 
documented decrease in libido in males as age increases.”55 
Disturbingly, there appears to be very little research into the 
efficacy of civil commitment. Other than incapacitation, there is scarce 
empirical evidence of its long-term benefits, and little research has 
explored its effectiveness on sexually violent predators.56 
 
52. See, e.g., Donna Schram & Cheryl Milloy, Sexually Violent 
Predators and Civil Commitment: A Study of the 
Characteristics and Recidivism of Sex Offenders Considered 
for Civil Commitment but for Whom Proceedings Were 
Declined i, 9 (1998), https://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1278/ 
Wsipp_Sexually-Violent-Predators-and-Civil-Commitment_Full-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZR2Y-ML93] (explaining that when tracking the 
official records of sixty-one sex offenders who had been released during 
the first six years of the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990, 
41 percent of the group were not rearrested at a mean follow-up of almost 
four years, and, of the 59 percent who were rearrested, only 28 percent 
had committed further sex offenses; the non-offenders could have been 
subjected to life sentences without parole). 
53. This is a measurement of penile blood volume change, rather than penile 
circumference change. See Ray Blanchard et al., Phallometric Comparison 
of Pedophilic Interest in Nonadmitting Sexual Offenders Against 
Stepdaughters, Biological Daughters, Other Biologically Related Girls, and 
Unrelated Girls, 18 Sexual Abuse 1, 6 (2006). 
54. Robert Alan Prentky & Austin F. S. Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release on 
Long Term Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual 
Offenders, 19 Sex Abuse 43, 45 (2007) (citing Howard E. Barbaree et al., 
The Development of Sexual Aggression Through the Life Span: The Effect 
of Age on Sexual Arousal and Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 989 
Anns. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 59 (2003)). 
55. Id. But see Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What Does It Mean When 
Age Is Related to Recidivism Among Sex Offenders?, 38 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 151 (2014) (“No adjustment to a sex offender’s score on a 
comprehensive actuarial tool that includes age at first or index offense 
should be made simply because the offender is older.”). 
56. The Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt., The Comprehensive 
Approach to Sex Offender Management 1–2 (2008); see Astrid 
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Regulating, criminalizing, and sanctioning actions involving sexual 
activity—void of sexual offending—has had a complicated and rocky 
history within the law and courts.57 Cases involving sex crimes can 
further complicate a judge’s established “moral” position on sensitive 
issues, and court decisions are unlike any other area in our 
jurisprudence.58 The judgment that precedes the adjudication of these 
crimes is overwhelming and steeped in fear, disgust, and a belief that 
the charged individual is automatically guilty and deviant. There is 
rampant ignorance as to the legal, societal, and psychological 
underpinnings of the circumstances surrounding these cases by not only 
the “court of public opinion” but of the highest court itself.59 
And now, for the first time, we are beginning to see some of the 
legal roots of these attitudes. In a recent article, Professor Ira Ellman 
and a colleague discussed the Supreme Court’s continued reference to 
the “frightening and high” statistics of recidivism by sexual offenders.60 
They referenced two fundamental decisions by the Court that set the 
 
Birgden & Heather Cucolo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Evidence, 
Ethics, and Human Rights, 23 Sexual Abuse 295, 300–301 (2011). 
57. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that 
there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states 
could outlaw those practices) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute forbidding two persons 
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates due 
process clause); Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict 
Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 313, 
317 (2003) (discussing “the ‘public welfare offense’ model where the 
majority of jurisdictions, either by legislative enactment or court decision, 
have determined that the protection of the community demands strict 
regulation of sexual activity”). On how the public responds in related 
ways to questions of both sexual autonomy and sexual offenses in matters 
involving persons with mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, Heather 
Ellis Cucolo & Alison J. Lynch, Sex, Sexuality, Sexual Offending and the 
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 6 Laws 20 (2017); Michael L. 
Perlin, Alison J. Lynch, & Valerie R. McClain, “Some Things are Too 
Hot to Touch”: Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles 
of Lawyers and Expert Witnesses, 34 Touro L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). 
On how the public demands strict regulation of consensual sexual activity 
on the part of persons with mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin 
& Alison J. Lynch, Sexuality, Disability and the Law: Beyond 
the Last Frontier? (2016). 
58. See Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 21, § 5-6.4.1 (characterizing the 
Court’s decisions in sex offender area as “void of concrete and credible 
supporting evidence”). 
59. See Dara L. Schottenfeld, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex 
Offenders, Oh My: Why It Is Time to Call Off the Hunt, 20 St. Thomas 
L. Rev. 359, 361 (2008). 
60. Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme 
Court’s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 Const. 
Comment. 495, 496 (2015). 
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stage for inaccurate statistical reference to the re-offense rate of 
offenders.61 
In one of those cases, McKune v. Lile,62 the Court, relying on one 
prior source, cited an 80 percent rate of re-offense for untreated 
offenders as a basis underlying the justification to restrict the rights 
and liberties of individuals convicted of sexual offenses.63 The Court 
noted that convicted sex offenders who reenter society are much more 
likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape 
or sexual assault and “[s]tates thus have a vital interest in rehabilitating 
convicted sex offenders.”64 The Court’s acceptance of the re-offense rate 
as “frightening and high” and much greater than the rate for other 
offenders has been echoed by federal and state courts ever since.65 
According to the article by Professor Ellman and his colleague: 
McKune provides a single citation to support its statement “that 
the recidivism rate of untreated offenders has been estimated to 
be as high as 80%:” the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat. Institute of 
Corrections, A Practitioner’s Guide to Treating the Incarcerated 
Male Sex Offender xiii (1988). Justice Kennedy likely found that 
reference in the amicus brief supporting Kansas filed by the 
Solicitor General . . . as the SG’s brief also cites it for the claim 
that sex offenders have this astonishingly high recidivism rate. 
This Practitioner’s Guide itself provides but one source for the 
claim, an article published in 1986 in Psychology Today, a mass 
market magazine aimed at a lay audience. That article has this  
61. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
See generally Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 21, §§ 5-4.10.1.1, 5-6.5.1. 
62. 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
63. Id. at 33 (citing U.S. Dept. of Just., A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender xiii (1988)); see 
infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
64. McKune, 536 U.S. at 34. 
65. A LexisNexis search yielded over 100 cases that use the “frightening and 
high” language when determining the outcome of sex offender cases. See, 
e.g., Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (“As in 
Smith, the legislative reasoning behind SORA is readily discernible: 
recidivism rates of sex offenders, according to both the Michigan 
legislature and Smith, are ‘frightening and high.’”); Belleau v. Wall, 811 
F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 103 (2003) . . . , remarked on ‘the high rate of recidivism among 
convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class.’ The risk of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders is “frightening and high.” . . . “When 
convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than 
any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual 
assault.”); see, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 760 F. Supp. 2d 116, 128–
29 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v. Garner, 490 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 
2007); State v. Peterson-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1146 (Kan. 2016); Doss v. 
State, No. 08-1512, 2009 WL 2184835, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 
2009). 
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sentence: “Most untreated sex offenders released from prison go 
on to commit more offenses—indeed, as many as 80% do.” But 
the sentence is a bare assertion: the article contains no supporting 
reference for it. Nor does its author appear to have the scientific 
credentials that would qualify him to testify at trial as an expert 
on recidivism. He is a counselor, not a scholar of sex crimes or re-
offense rates, and the cited article is not about recidivism 
statistics. It’s about a counseling program for sex offenders he 
then ran in an Oregon prison. His unsupported assertion about 
the recidivism rate for untreated sex offenders was offered to 
contrast with his equally unsupported assertion about the lower 
recidivism rate for those who complete his program.66 
Thus, the authors conclude that “the evidence for McKune’s claim 
that offenders have high re-offense rates (and the effectiveness of 
counseling programs in reducing it) was just the unsupported assertion 
of someone without research expertise who made his living selling such 
counseling programs to prisons.”67 
Others have used Ellman’s reasoning to sway courts in their view 
of the case. In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant’s arguments with these words: 
The problem for the defendant is that, regardless of how 
convincing that social science may be, “the legislature is in a 
better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data 
bearing on complex problems.” Simply put, we are not a 
superlegislature.68 
 
66. Ellman & Ellman, supra note 60, at 497–98 (internal citations omitted); 
see also Steven Yoder, What’s the Real Rate of Sex-Crime Recidivism?, 
Pac. Standard (May 27, 2016) (citations omitted), https://psmag.com/ 
news/whats-the-real-rate-of-sex-crime-recidivism [https://perma.cc/ 
JBW4-LFBS] (critiquing the Robert Freeman-Longo’s article Changing a 
Life-time of Sexual Crime, Psychol. Today (1986)). 
67. Ellman & Ellman, supra note 60, at 499. Ellman and Ellman asserted that 
“the Solicitor General was complicit in urging the Court toward this 
conclusion with the argument that ‘[t]he absence of ready and reasonable 
alternatives for reducing recidivism among convicted sexual offenders 
bolsters the constitutionality of [Kansas’s Sexual Abuse Treatment 
Program].’” Id. at n.15 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amici 
Curiae at 24, McKune v. Lile, 536 N.W.2d 24 (2002) (No. 00-1187)). 
68. People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E. 3d 984, 992–93 (Ill. 2018) (citations omitted). 
Tellingly, footnote 3 in the Pepitone opinion says this: 
One of the amicus briefs reminds us that it is ‘perhaps subjective’ 
whether recidivism rates are low or high. Further, as the State 
observes, ‘[n]obody knows the true re-offense rate for child sex 
offenders’ because only a small percentage of sex offenses are 
reported and only a small percentage of reported offenses result in 
arrests. However, ‘researchers widely agree that observed 
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In the other opinion, in his dissent in State v. Peterson-Beard,69 
writing for himself and two colleagues, Judge Johnson drew extensively 
on the Ellmans’ research, concluding that “a recent investigation into 
the source of Smith’s seemingly compelling statistics calls into question 
their bona fides.”70 Following this lengthy review, he concluded: 
The article recognized that human nature is such that, when faced 
with an immeasurable fear and strongly held belief, a person will 
tend to ignore or discount quantifiable facts. “The label ‘sex 
offender’ triggers fear, and disgust as well. Both responses breed 
beliefs that do not yield easily to facts.” [Ellman & Ellman], 30 
Const. Comment. at 508. Yet, I must cling to the belief that the 
persons who have been privileged to serve on our nation’s highest 
Court will yield to the facts and give a closer look at whether our 
statutory scheme is rationally connected to the nonpunitive 
purpose of public safety and whether its terms and conditions are 
excessive in relation to that public safety purpose. If they do, I 
submit that an objective analysis will disclose that, in the current 
version of [the Kansas sex offender law], public safety has crossed 
over the line and is now a “sham or mere pretext” for imposing 
additional punishment on the offender.71 
In spite of the existence of extensive scientific literature on sexual 
and violent recidivism research, myths and misconceptions continue to 
exist. Stunningly, a recent investigative article underscores that at least 
one state—California—sought to suppress research studies that showed 
that untreated sex offenders with all of the risk factors of committed 
SVPs contributed to only 6.5 percent of contact sex crimes during an 
almost five-year exposure in the community.72 The article also explained 
 
recidivism rates are underestimates of the true reoffense rates of 
sex offenders.’ 
 Id. at 992 n.3 (citing Off. of Sex Offender Sent’g, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, & Tracking, Sex Offender 
Management Assessment and Planning Initiative 91 (Chris 
Lobanov-Rostovsky & Roger Przybylski eds., 2014), https://www.smart.gov/ 
SOMAPI/pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/59TK-
TNLN]. 
69. 377 P.3d 1127 (Kan. 2016). 
70. Id. at 1146. 
71. Id. at 1147. 
72. Tamara Rice Lave & Franklin E. Zimring, Assessing the Real Risk of 
Sexually Violent Predators: Doctor Padilla’s Dangerous Data, 55 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 705, 709–10, 724–28 (2018) (detailing the efforts made to 
suppress this study). 
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that California “shut down” the study when these statistics became 
known.73 
The irrational fear over these types of crimes permeates all facets 
of the law—this fear affects lawyers (both prosecutors and defense 
counsel), legislators, and judges alike.74 Throughout the case law, from 
the inception of the new generation laws until the present, myths and 
misconceptions continue to be voiced by the courts in  
making their decisions.75 Yet, the inadequate and inaccurate response 
to sexual offending can be mainly attributed to the failure of public 
policy to create a working relationship between effective law making 
and sexual-violence prevention and intervention.76 
This is not the end of the story. In recent years, some state and 
federal courts have begun to scale back restrictions on sex offenders and 
scrutinize the constitutionality of enacted laws. The decade or so of 
poking holes in the solid foundation of incorrect and unfounded beliefs 
surrounding sexual offending appears to have finally made an impact 
in the judiciary.77 Several recent decisions, in certain jurisdictions, have 
thus abruptly halted the “runaway train” of sex offender legislation. 
 
73. Id. at 740 (positing that these findings “undermine any theory of fixed 
levels of sexual violence risk”). 
74. Edward I. Koch, The Independence of the Judiciary?, 1 N.Y. City L. 
Rev. 457, 477–78 (1996) (asserting that “[i]t is not just public officials 
who are guilty of exerting pressure against judges” by recounting the press 
attacks against Judge Denny Chin for ruling that New York’s Megan’s 
Law could not be applied retroactively in Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). See generally Jill Levenson et al., Public 
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 
Analyses Soc. Issues & Pub. Pol’y 1, 2 (2007) (“Sex offenders and 
sex crimes incite a great deal of fear among the general public, and as a 
result, lawmakers have passed a variety of social policies designed to 
protect community members from sexual victimization.”). 
75. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:561.2 (2012) (showing that the Louisiana 
legislature relied upon purported high recidivism rates among sex 
offenders as its justification for the non-punitive objective of protecting 
the public from sexual re-offenders, without any proof or certainty of this 
statement); see United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 127 (2010) 
(accepting, in the majority’s opinion, the fact that sexual predators pose 
a high risk of dangerousness and that future risk can be determined). 
76. Joan Tabachnick & Alisa Klein, Ass’n for the Treatment of 
Sexual Abusers, A Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex Offender 
Policy to Prevent Child Sexual Abuse 3 (2011), http://www. 
atsa.com/pdfs/ppReasonedApproach.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ7Z-KMEL] 
(“Experts agree that a criminal justice response alone cannot prevent 
sexual abuse or keep communities safe. Yet, tougher sentencing and 
increased monitoring of sex offenders are fully funded in many states, 
while victim services and prevention programs are woefully 
underfunded.”). 
77. Although much groundwork has been laid in questioning misconceptions, 
the research of Ira Ellman and Tara Ellman that has been scarcely noted 
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In late 2016, the Sixth Circuit concluded in Does #1–5 v. Snyder 
that Michigan’s sex offender registry and residency restriction law 
constituted ex post facto punishment.78 Significantly, this decision stood 
in stark contrast with the judgments of other courts that have largely 
rejected various constitutional challenges to specialized sex offender 
laws and policies.79 In Does #1–5, the plaintiffs, who filed anonymously, 
argued that various provisions of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration 
Act (“SORA”) were “unconstitutionally vague, should not be enforced 
under strict liability standards, infringed upon freedom of speech, and 
hobbled their rights to parent, work, and travel.”80 
The Sixth Circuit found the retroactive application of SORA to be 
punitive and therefore unconstitutional.81 In conducting the rationality-
excessiveness test, the court considered the legislature’s stated goals of 
promoting public safety and reducing recidivism.82 The court found 
little to no evidence on the record to support the claim that SORA 
served either of these goals.83 Considering the stated goal of reducing 
recidivism, the court found the evidence in the record demonstrated 
SORA had, at best, no impact on recidivism.84 In fact, the court found 
evidence in the record that the law may actually increase the risk of 
recidivism.85 Compounding the court’s unwillingness to uphold SORA 
was the State of Michigan’s failure to so much as analyze recidivism 
rates in the state, despite having the necessary data to do so.86 As for 
public safety, the court found that the record disclosed no relationship 
between SORA’s registration requirements and public safety 
whatsoever. Upholding SORA, the court found, would amount to 
writing a blank check to the legislature to pass whatever laws it 
wished.87 
Of note in the Does #1–5 case was the unique approach that the 
Sixth Circuit took by discussing “scientific evidence that refutes 
 
and discussed in the recent case law must be acknowledged. See Ellman 
& Ellman, supra note 60. 
78. 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016). 
79. Melissa Hamilton, Constitutional Law and the Role of Scientific Evidence: 
The Transformative Potential of Doe v. Snyder, 58 B.C. L. Rev. E-
Supplement 34 (2017). 
80. Id. at 37 (first citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.729 (2011), and then citing 
Does #1–5, 834 F.3d at 698). 
81. Does #1–5, 834 F.3d at 705–06. 
82. Id. at 704. 
83. Id. at 704–05. 
84. Id. at 704. 
85. Id. at 704–05 (citing Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 16, at 168–69). 
86. Id. at 705. 
87. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
“The Strings in the Books Ain't Pulled and Persuaded” 
656 
moralized judgments about sex offenders, specifically that they pose a 
unique and substantial risk of recidivism.”88 Melissa Hamilton, in her 
important article highlighting these points, identified the significance of 
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and analysis. Hamilton focused on the 
implication of the court’s suspicion of the long-held belief that sex 
offender recidivism was “frightening and high” and that it was not 
clearly supported by the scientific evidence.89 
Other courts have followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead in rejecting 
“frightening and high statistics” as the bases for decisions in sex 
offender cases. By way of example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
in Commonwealth v. Muniz,90 held that the Sexual Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), or Megan’s Law IV, 
registration requirements were “punishment,” thus violating the ex post 
facto clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions.91 Such 
requirements could not be applied retroactively, the court found, as the 
individual had already been sentenced for the predicate crime. 
 Elsewhere, in Millard v. Rankin,92 Judge Matsch distinguished the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Doe93 by employing the same 
factors that had been used in the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez case.94 
In reaching an alternative conclusion, the Millard court distinguished 
Colorado’s SORNA from the Alaska statute that had been at issue in 
Smith.95 Judge Matsch stressed that Colorado’s SORNA imposed 
affirmative disabilities or restraints that were greater than those 
deemed “minor and indirect” by the Supreme Court in Smith.96 Thus, 
 
88. Hamilton, supra note 79, at 34. 
89. Id. 
90. 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). 
91. Id. at 1218. 
92. 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1226 (D. Colo. 2017). 
93. 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003). 
94. Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1223–24 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).The factors in Kennedy were: 
whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: (1) has been 
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; (2) imposes an 
“affirmative disability or restraint;” (3) “promote[s] the traditional aims 
of punishment;” (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; 
(5) is excessive with respect to this purpose; (6) “comes into play only on 
a finding of scienter;” and (7) “whether the behavior to which it applies 
is already a crime.” 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
95. Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. 
96. Id. at 1229 (noting that in Smith, “the Court expressly noted that the law 
under consideration did not have an in-person reporting requirement, and 
further stated that the record contained ‘no evidence that the Act has led 
to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex 
offenders that would not have otherwise occurred’” (quoting Smith, 538 
U.S. at 100)). 
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Judge Matsch held that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of 
finding the state’s SORNA requirements punitive in their effects and, 
therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.97 
In Millard, persons who were registered under the Colorado Sex 
Offender Registration Act98 brought a § 1983 civil action and claimed 
that the Colorado SORA violated their rights under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In finding 
that the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated,99 the court looked at the criminal history of registrants David 
Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, detailing the crimes that 
placed them on the registry and focusing on the resulting hardships of 
being classified as a “sex offender” in the community. 
David Millard was forced to change residences and, as a result of 
highly detailed information published on the internet, constantly feared 
that his sex offender status would be discovered and result in his loss 
of employment.100 Eugene Knight was a full-time father who received a 
letter from his child’s school that identified him as a sex offender and 
barred him from entering school grounds. The court noted that “[t]his 
exclusion from his children’s school is solely because he is a registered 
sex offender. Neither DPS nor anyone else had ever accused Mr. Knight 
of any conduct allegedly disrupting school operations or creating an 
unsafe or threatening school environment.”101 Arturo Vega, who was 
adjudicated as a juvenile offender at age fifteen for conduct occurring 
when he was thirteen years old, detailed the difficulty experienced in 
his employment as a direct consequence of his presence on the sex 
offender registry.102 Because Mr. Vega was a juvenile offender, he made 
prior attempts to be removed from the registry. During the prior 
proceedings for removal, the magistrates improperly placed the burden 
on Mr. Vega to prove that another offense was not likely.103 This 
 
97. Id. at 1231, 1235. 
98. Id. at 1214. SORA requires a person convicted of unlawful sexual behavior 
or another offense, the underlying factual basis of which involves unlawful 
sexual behavior, to register with the state as a sex offender. Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 16-22-103 (2018). SORA defines unlawful sexual behavior to 
include a wide range of offenses, and its registration requirements apply 
to both adult and juvenile offenders. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 
151, 156–57 (Colo. 2003); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-102(3) 
(2018) (defining “conviction”); id. § 16-22-102(9) (defining “unlawful 
sexual behavior”). 
99. Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d. at 1235. 
100. Id. at 1218. 
101. Id. at 1220. 
102. Id. at 1220–21. 
103. Id. at 1221–22. 
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testimony by Mr. Vega, prompted the Millard court to aptly describe 
the prior proceedings as a “Kafka-esque procedure, which was played 
out not once but twice, [and] deprived Mr. Vega of his liberty without 
providing procedural due process.”104 
In addition to reviewing the personal hardships faced by the 
plaintiffs, the Millard court took note of a recent shift in the Supreme 
Court’s conceptualization of privacy and access to the internet by citing 
the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina.105 Although 
Packingham had dealt with First Amendment violations of registered 
sex offenders, it contained a foreshadowing statement that applied 
directly to the issue in Millard.106 In his majority opinion in Packingham, 
Justice Kennedy highlighted “the troubling fact that the law imposes 
severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence 
and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice 
system,” but noted that this was not an issue currently before the 
Court.107 Two months after the decision in Packingham, the Millard 
court seized upon the significance of Justice Kennedy’s observation and 
took advantage of the ripeness of that issue in the case at bar.108 The 
Millard court fittingly took the language contained in Packingham and 
applied it to the relevant facts and circumstances of the Millard 
plaintiffs. 
This ongoing imposition of a known and uncontrollable risk of 
public abuse of information from the sex offender registry, in the 
absence of any link to an objective risk to the public posed by 
each individual sex offender, has resulted in and continues to 
threaten Plaintiffs with punishment disproportionate to the 
offenses they committed. Where the nature of such punishment 
is by its nature uncertain and unpredictable, the state cannot 
assure that it will ever be proportionate to the offense. SORA as 
applied to these Plaintiffs therefore violates the Eighth 
Amendment.109 
The decisions in Does #1–5, Muniz, and Millard represent 
significant evidence of a judicial shift—in those three jurisdictions—in 
evaluating the constitutionality of SORA as applied. Noteworthy as 
well is the case of Karsjens v. Jesson,110 that dealt with the “as applied” 
 
104. Id. at 1233. 
105. Id. at 1228 (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 
(2017)). 
106. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733. 
107. Id. at 1737. 
108. See Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. 
109. Id. at 1232. 
110. 6 F. Supp. 3d 916 (D. Minn. 2014). 
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constitutionality of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). In 
Karsjens, multiple claims were brought under a § 1983 class action 
asserting that the MSOP was punitive in effect.111 The class action 
alleged, among other things, that the MSOP failed to provide treatment 
and denied the right to be free of inhumane treatment.112 The court 
displayed its assurance that plaintiffs would likely succeed if, through 
discovery, they can demonstrate that the commitment scheme is 
systematically applied in a way that indefinitely commits individuals 
who are no longer dangerous.113 Judge Frank took seriously the 
plaintiffs’ claims, stating that the program in Minnesota is “clearly 
broken,” and might be “one of the most draconian sex offender 
programs in existence.”114 The court observed as follows: 
At the center of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Minnesota sex offender 
commitment scheme is the allegation that a commitment to 
MSOP essentially amounts to life-long confinement, equivalent to 
a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and 
run like, a medium to high security prison. Under such conditions, 
and assuming the allegations in the Complaint to be true, it 
appears that MSOP may very well be serving the constitutionally 
impermissible purposes of retribution and deterrence.115 
A year later, on February 2, 2015, the same court denied a motion 
to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment by defendants and 
reiterated that, “[n]ot only does this case address the rights of those 
populations in our society that are most disliked and feared (and a 
number of individuals who are vulnerable), but it also heightens the 
concerns and fears of the public at large.”116 In a noteworthy footnote, 
the court acknowledged and refused to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ assertion 
that: 
Defendants were “aware of the failure to progress Plaintiffs and 
[c]lass members through the different treatment phases to the 
point that they could be conditionally or unconditionally 
released” and that “the MSOP treatment program as 
implemented had only conditionally released a single person and 
 
111. Id. at 926–27. 
112. Id. at 926. 
113. Id. at 931. 
114. Id. at 956. 
115. Id. at 931. 
116. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. CV 11-3659 (DWF/JJK), 2015 WL 420013, at 
*18 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2015). 
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had never unconditionally released anyone committed to 
MSOP.”117 
Even within this small segment of the opinion, the court created 
history by recognizing and proclaiming the above long-held suspicion 
and concern by individuals who question the basis for sex offender civil 
commitment. In further momentous recognition, the court stressed the 
underlying politics of this area of the law: 
Moreover, the record before the Court highlights both the best 
and the worst of the three branches of our government. At a 
minimum, the evidence has shown that, to date, the executive 
and legislative branches in Minnesota have let politics, rather 
than the rule of law and the rights of “all” of their citizens guide 
their decisions. In a situation such as this, the federal court may 
have to step in to protect the rights of Plaintiffs.118 
Any optimism inspired by Judge Frank’s decision ended with the 
decision of the Eighth Circuit, which, in Karsjens v. Piper,119 reversed 
Judge Frank’s opinion and found no substantive due process 
violation.120 The Eighth Circuit explained that although civil 
commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty, the Supreme Court 
has never held that individuals “who pose a significant danger to 
themselves or others possess a fundamental liberty interest in freedom 
from physical restraint.”121 
In reviewing the recent cases that impact sex offender laws, it is 
noteworthy to consider how the denial of the petitions for certiorari by 
the Supreme Court in both the Karsjens case and the Does #1–5 case 
affect the dialogue about a potential shift of opinion in the highest court 
 
117. Id. at *17 n.29 (citing Third Amended Complaint at 34, 81, 83–84, 
Karsjens, 2015 WL 420013). 
118. Id. at *18 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980) (“[T]he 
role of an Article III judge is to safeguard a litigant’s ‘right to have claims 
decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other 
branches of government.’”)). 
119. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017). 
120. Id. at 410–11. 
121. Id. at 407. In particular, the Eighth Circuit held that “[a]lthough the 
Supreme Court has characterized civil commitment as a ‘significant 
deprivation of liberty,’ it has never declared that persons who pose a 
significant danger to themselves or others possess a fundamental liberty 
interest in freedom from physical restraint.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 116 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting), 
which “criticiz[ed] the majority’s analysis of a due process challenge to a 
civil commitment statute because, ‘[f]irst, the Court never explains 
whether we are dealing here with a fundamental right, and . . . [s]econd, 
the Court never discloses what standard of review applies’”). 
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in the land. By denying the petition for certiorari in Does #1–5,122 the 
Supreme Court left in place a decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that had declared portions of the law unconstitutional and 
effectively required the Michigan legislature to replace the existing 
law.123 In denying the petition for certiorari in Karsjens,124 the Supreme 
Court left the Eighth Circuit ruling to stand as precedent in the sex 
offender civil commitment system within Minnesota and other states in 
that Circuit. 
Theoretically, the Court’s refusal to review the Karsjens case could 
be viewed as an abdication of constitutional oversight of sex offender 
commitment laws. One can question whether the Court was merely 
scaling back its federal oversight in these state issues or whether the 
Court is not quite ready to fully confront the “frightening and high” 
mythology that was exposed in Professor Ellman’s article.125 But, either 
way, in both circumstances, had the Court granted certiorari, it would 
have been forced to confront recent developments within the scientific 
community, in some manner or fashion, in order to effectively evaluate 
the constitutional issues raised. This entry into the “scientific world” is 
a “can of worms” that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to open 
fully; yet in this especially unique area of the law, it is impossible to 
divorce the science from the legislation in the determination of 
constitutionality.126 
II. On Shame and Humiliation 
Shame and humiliation are often felt in combination with one 
another; it is necessary to consider both in detail in order to seek to 
understand how these emotions are generated as a direct result of our 
treatment of individuals that have been labeled as sexual offenders. 
 
122. Snyder v. John Does #1–5, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (mem.). 
123. Snyder v. John Does #1–5, 834 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir. 2016). 
124. Karsjens v. Piper, 138 S. Ct. 106, 107 (2017) (mem.). 
125. See Ellman & Ellman, supra note 60, at 496. 
126. See Cucolo & Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 29, 
at 10. 
But we must honestly and thoroughly investigate the reasons 
supporting the enactment of such legislation while scrutinizing 
legislative usage of medical and scientific testimony to support 
sex-offender commitments. Before we could even begin to address 
the problems surrounding the science, however, we would need to 
re-consider the laws and foundations on which they were based. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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A. Shame 
There is no question in our mind that our society has become one 
in which shame is used as a modality to control defendants’ behavior.127 
“Shame is bordered by embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification, 
in porous ways that are difficult to predict or contain,” and it is “one 
of the most important, painful and intensive of all emotions.”128 “Shame 
is considered to be more painful than guilt because one’s core self—not 
simply one’s behavior—is at stake.”129 
“[S]hame [is] the emotion we experience when we realize that we 
are not living up to our standards or ideals.”130 Shame can occur alone 
or with another who causes or heightens the experience. “The shamed 
person feels exposed and wants to hide.”131 
B. Humiliation 
The authors noted in an earlier article: “[h]umiliation is the 
emotional experience of being lowered in status, usually by another 
person. There is the associated sense of powerlessness.”132 Humiliation 
has been defined as “the rejection of human beings as human, that is, 
treating people as if they were not human beings but merely things, 
tools, animals, subhumans, or inferior humans.”133 It is thus no surprise 
 
127. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 4. 
128. Id. at 7 (first quoting, Toni M. Massaro, The Meaning of Shame: 
Implications for Legal Reform, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 645, 655 
(1997); and then quoting Robert Svensson et al., Moral Emotions and 
Offending: Do Feelings of Anticipated Shame and Guilt Mediate the Effect 
of Socializing on Offending?, 10 Eur. J. Criminology 2, 3 (2013)). 
129. Id. (quoting June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral 
Behavior, 58 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 345, 349 (2007)). 
130. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and 
Preventing Shame and Humiliation by Improving the Quality and 
Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Civil 
Commitment Cases, 28 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 291, 292 (2017) 
[hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity]. 
131. Aaron Lazare & Wilton S. Sogg, Shame, Humiliation and Stigma in the 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 47 Prac. Law. 11, 12 (2001). On potential 
strategies to ameliorate the extent to which persons with mental illness 
are stigmatized, see Sareen K. Armani, Coexisting Definitions of Mental 
Illness: Legal, Medical, and Layperson Understandings Paving a Path for 
Jury Bias, 26 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 213 (2017). 
132. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 130, at 292 (emphasis 
added). 
133. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 8 (quoting Anita Bernstein, 
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 487 
n.266 (1997)). 
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that the vast majority of sex offenders self-report being humiliated on 
a daily basis.134 Elsewhere, with a colleague, Michael L. Perlin wrote: 
The use of humiliation techniques, whether done in overt or 
passive ways, violates rights to due process, privacy, and freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishment. By marginalizing the rights 
of those who are shamed and humiliated, such individuals are 
treated as less than human.135 
Think about this in the context of criminal punishments—though 
we adhere to the fantasy that SVPA commitments are not criminal, per 
the pretextual decision of Kansas v. Hendricks,136 there is no question 
that they are.137 “Punishment was originally needed to ‘remove the evil 
spirit thought to cause an individual to transgress against society.’ It is 
a ritualistic device conveying ‘moral condemnation,’ ‘inflicting 
humiliation,’ and dramatizing evil through a public ‘degradation 
ceremony.’”138 In a parallel context, consider Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
in Sandin v. Conner, in which she argued that the stigma of punitive 
segregation “should suffice to qualify such confinement as liberty 
depriving for purposes of Due Process Clause protection.”139 There is no 
 
134. Cucolo & Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 29, at 
31 n.177 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sex Offender Community 
Notification: Assessing the Impact in Wisconsin 9 (2000), 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/179992.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KP8-YTTD], 
which found “that seventy-seven percent of interviewed sex offenders told 
of being humiliated in their daily lives . . . due to expanded notification 
actions.”). 
135. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Bernstein, supra note 133, 
at 489–90). 
136. 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success like 
Failure/and Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247, 1248–49 (1998) (discussing 
the Hendricks decision). 
137. We define “pretextuality” as courts’ acceptance, either implicitly or 
explicitly, of “testimonial dishonesty” and their “engage[ment] similarly 
in dishonest decisionmaking.” See Perlin, supra note 136, at 1252. See 
generally Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and 
Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive 
Dissonance, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 131, 133 (1991). 
138. Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”: The 
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the 
Culture of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375, 1385 (1997) (quoting 
Christopher Hibbert, The Roots of Evil: A Social History of 
Crime and Punishment 32 (1963), which “discuss[es] the use of sticks, 
pillory, branding iron, ducking stool, and scarlet letters”). 
139. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 489 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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question that “SVPA proceedings . . . are invariably and inevitably 
inundated with stigma, shame, and humiliation.”140 
It is also disconcerting to note that matters have gotten worse in 
recent years. Studies have found that “[p]erceptions of individuals with 
mental illness as dangerous have increased over time . . . . [T]he odds 
of describing a person with mental illness as violent in 1996 were 2.3 
times the odds of describing a person with mental illness as violent in 
1950.”141 In short, the statistical errors on which courts rely—abetted 
by misleading media depictions142—create an environment in which 
shame and humiliation fester and through which the judicial process is 
trivialized, just as we regularly trivialize both valid and reliable 
behavior research when it is dissonant with our false “ordinary common 
sense”143 and the experiences of persons with mental illness.144 There is 
no question left “on the table” about the law’s power to shame and 
humiliate.145 
 
140. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 130, at 295. 
141. Angela M. Parcesepe & Leopoldo J. Cabassa, Public Stigma of Mental 
Illness in the United States: A Systematic Literature Review, 40 Admin. 
& Pol’y Mental Health & Mental Health Servs. Res. 384, 388 
(2013), as quoted in Aurélie Tabuteau Mangels, Should Individuals with 
Severe Mental Illness Continue to Be Eligible for the Death Penalty?, 32 
Crim. Just. 9, 11 (2017). 
142. See generally Cucolo & Perlin, Impact of Media Distortions, supra note 
24. 
143. False “ordinary common sense” is a “‘self-referential and non-reflective’ 
way of constructing the world ‘(“I see it that way, therefore everyone sees 
it that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the way it is”).’ It is 
supported by our reliance on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying 
devices that distort our abilities to rationally consider information.” 
Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Tolling for the Aching Ones 
Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of Racial 
Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability Law, 20 J. 
Gender, Race & Just. 431, 453 (2017) (first quoting Cucolo & Perlin, 
Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 29, at 38; and then 
quoting Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, 
Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 Ga. 
St. U. L. Rev. 607, 622 (2009)). 
144. See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, How Teaching About 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Can Be a Tool of Social Justice, and Lead 
Law Students to Personally and Socially Rewarding Careers: Sexuality 
and Disability as a Case Example, 16 Nev. L.J. 209, 216 n.41 (2015) 
(citing Michael L. Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental 
Disability on Trial (2000)). 
145. Id. at 224 n.85. 
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III. How This Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence146 
Therapeutic jurisprudence looks at the impact of law on people’s 
lives,147 focusing upon the law’s influence on “emotional life and 
psychological well-being.”148 It seeks “to determine whether legal rules 
and procedures or lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance 
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process 
principles.”149 Per Professor David Wexler, the tension in this inquiry 
must be resolved in this manner: “The law’s use of ‘mental health 
information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge[] upon 
justice concerns.’”150 
In a series of articles and a book, we have assessed various aspects 
of sex offender policies through the prism of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.151 In one of those articles, we concluded that we believe 
 
146. Part III is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 
“All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the 
Competence to Have Sex, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 257, 277–79 (2014) and 
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”: 
Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 Va. J. 
Crim. L. 304 (2016). Further, it distills the work of Michael L. Perlin 
over the past twenty-five years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What 
Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 623 (1993); 
see also Michael L. Perlin, “Have You Seen Dignity?”: The Story of the 
Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 U.N.Z. Law Rev. 1135 
(2017) [hereinafter Perlin, Seen Dignity]; Michael L. Perlin, “Changing of 
the Guards”: David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and the 
Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 63 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 3 
(2019). 
147. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 146, at 277 (quoting Bruce J. Winick, 
Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with 
Victims of Crime, 33 Nova L. Rev. 535, 535 (2009)). 
148. Id. (citing David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, 67 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 317 (1998)). 
149. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 146, at 277 (emphasis added); see, e.g., 
Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say 
What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to 
Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 751 (2005). 
150. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 146, at 277–78 (quoting David B. Wexler, 
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Scholarship, 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993)). 
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Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 125 
(2015) [hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”]; 
Perlin, Cucolo & Lynch, supra note 57; Perlin, Lynch & McClain, supra 
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that it is only through the use of therapeutic jurisprudence that we can 
best diminish the shaming and humiliating aspects of these processes.152 
We know that nothing so clearly violates “the dignity of persons as 
treatment that demeans or humiliates them” as shaming.153 To be 
consistent with therapeutic jurisprudence principles we must, rather, 
focus on reintegrating sex offenders into society and promoting sex 
offenders’ self-respect and dignity while fostering family and community 
relationships.154 In an earlier article focusing on the right to and quality 
of counsel at SVPA hearings, we made this point: 
Those very variables that make SVPA litigation different—the 
need for lawyers to be able to understand, contextualize and 
effectively cross-examine experts on specific actuarial tests; the 
need for lawyers to recognize when an expert witness is needed to 
rebut the state’s position, and the need for lawyers to understand 
the potential extent of jury bias (making the ideal of a fair trial 
even more difficult to accomplish)—all demand a [therapeutic 
jurisprudence] approach to representation and to litigation.155 
Certainly, the issues we raise here—the ways that courts use 
improper statistics and unverified data, misunderstand or ignore the 
significance of valid and reliable research, and fall prey to the 
perniciousness of the vividness heuristic, a cognitive-simplifying device 
through which a “single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains 
of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be  
“therapeutic jurisprudence.” In 1975, in one of Michael L. Perlin’s first 
articles, about the use of psychiatric testimony in criminal cases, he said 
this in discussing what he characterized as “quirky” cases: 
[Imagine] a defendant is charged with a minor offense (such as 
petty larceny) which nevertheless raises a question as to the 
possible existence of a psychiatric problem (e.g., where the 
defendant steals only pantyhose), a psychiatric examination may 
serve to indicate the real problem (if, in fact, one is present) and 
to direct the defendant towards a suitable therapeutic treatment 
program. 
 Perlin, Seen Dignity, supra note 146, at 1141 (quoting Michael L. Perlin, 
Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Law Setting, 3 Bull. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 143, 146 (1975) (emphasis added)). 
152. This sentence and the two subsequent sentences were originally published 
in Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 130, at 322–23. 
153. R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The 
Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 527, 
549 (2006) (quoting Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 848, 850 (1983)). 
154. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 130, at 322–23 (citing, 
inter alia, Cucolo & Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra 
note 29, at 40). 
155. Cucolo & Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space,” supra note 151, at 166–67. 
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made”156—like, the easily accessible Psychology Today article relied 
upon by the McKune court—all ignore the precepts of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and must be rejected as a modality of decisional 
analysis.157 Perhaps cases such as Muniz and Millard will give other 
judges some traction if they choose to reject the hysterical thinking that 
has been the hallmark of sex offender decision-making for the past two 
decades. 
Conclusion 
Although we have seen some significant steps forward in the courts’ 
recognition of rights violations and the mandate of necessary 
constitutional protections, overturning draconian laws and legislation 
continues to be an uphill battle. Clearly evidenced in numerous 
decisions, courts around the country continue to remain stagnant, 
clinging to misinformation and refusing to depart from prejudicial 
viewpoints that are pretextual and based on irrational fears. What 
continues to be the main culprit is the courts’ use of inaccurate 
statistics and unverified data. The shameful efforts of states to suppress 
the true data has totally dominated this area of law and policy.158 
We remain hopeful that some of the significant observations, such 
as those by Judge Frank in the Jesson case, as well as other recent 
caselaw on the rights of offenders in the community, will have a further 
impact on judges across the nation deciding similar issues in future 
lawsuits. To return to our title, the “strings in the books” are “being 
pulled and persuaded.” We—and others—have offered insight into 
these “strings,” yet key questions remain to be answered: in which 
direction are these “strings” being pulled, and is it factual or inaccurate 
information that underlies the “persua[sion]”? We believe it is 
imperative that scholars and researchers turn next to these questions 
to bring some measure of coherence—and honesty—to this complicated 
and emotionally-fraught area of law and policy. 
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York Law School’s efforts to educate students about sanism, 
pretextuality, heuristics, false “ordinary common sense,” and therapeutic 
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